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The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax
Haven Crackdown
By Niels Johannesen and Gabriel Zucman∗
During the financial crisis, G20 countries compelled tax havens to
sign bilateral treaties providing for exchange of bank information.
Policymakers have celebrated this global initiative as the end of
bank secrecy. Exploiting a unique panel dataset, our study is the
first attempt to assess how the treaties affected bank deposits in
tax havens. Rather than repatriating funds, our results suggest
that tax evaders shifted deposits to havens not covered by a treaty
with their home country. The crackdown thus caused a relocation
of deposits at the benefit of the least compliant havens. We discuss
the policy implications of these findings.
JEL: H26, H87, G21, K42
Keywords: Tax havens, Tax evasion
In August 2009, France and Switzerland amended their tax treaty. The two
countries agreed to exchange upon request all information necessary for tax en-
forcement, including bank information otherwise protected by Swiss bank secrecy
laws. Over the following months, one of France’s richest persons and her wealth
manager were taped discussing what to do with two undeclared Swiss bank ac-
counts, worth $160 million. After a visit to Switzerland, the wealth manager
concluded that keeping the funds in Swiss banks or bringing them back to France
would be too risky. He suggested that the funds be transferred to Hong Kong,
Singapore, or Uruguay, three tax havens which had not committed to exchanging
information with France. After the tapes were made public, they received exten-
sive newspaper coverage and eventually the funds were repatriated to France.1
The amendment to the French-Swiss tax treaty was part of a major initiative
to combat tax evasion at the global level. Since the end of the 1990s, the OECD
has encouraged tax havens to exchange information with other countries on the
basis of bilateral tax treaties, but until 2008 most tax havens declined to sign
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such treaties. During the financial crisis, the fight against tax evasion became a
political priority in rich countries and the pressure on tax havens mounted. At
the summit held in April 2009, G20 countries urged each tax haven to sign at
least 12 information exchange treaties under the threat of economic sanctions.
Between the summit and the end of 2009, the world’s tax havens signed a total
of more than 300 treaties.
The effectiveness of this crackdown on offshore tax evasion is highly contested.
A positive view asserts that treaties significantly raise the probability of detecting
tax evasion and greatly improve tax collection (OECD, 2011). According to policy
makers, “the era of bank secrecy is over” (G20, 2009). A negative view, on the
contrary, asserts that the G20 initiative leaves considerable scope for bank secrecy
and brings negligible benefits (Shaxson and Christensen, 2011). Whether the
positive or the negative view is closer to reality is the question we attempt to
address in this paper.
This is an important question for two reasons. First, the fight against offshore
tax evasion is a key policy issue. Globalization and the information technology
revolution have made it easier for tax evaders to move funds offshore. Absent
information exchange between countries, personal capital income taxes cannot be
properly enforced, giving rise to substantial revenue losses and constraining the
design of tax systems. Against the backdrop of the large public deficits faced by
most countries since the financial crisis, curbing tax evasion is high on the policy
agenda.
Second, although treaties have prevailed as the main policy instrument in the
fight against international tax evasion, surprisingly little is known about their ef-
fectiveness. The G20 crackdown has generated a lot of discussion in policy circles
but there is little fact-based evidence of its efficacy and no academic evaluation.
The OECD has launched a peer-review evaluation to assess whether treaties are
properly drafted and enforced, but while this legal work is necessary, it is not
sufficient: if the information exchange mechanism advocated by the OECD has
fundamental shortcomings, then even properly drafted and enforced treaties may
be ineffective. Our study is the first attempt to assess from a quantitative per-
spective the impact of the many treaties signed by tax havens since G20 countries
have made tax evasion a priority.
Providing compelling evidence on tax evasion is notoriously difficult, and even
harder in the complex area of international tax evasion. We break new ground in
this field by drawing on a particularly rich dataset on cross-border bank deposits.
For the purpose of our study, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has
given us access to bilateral bank deposit data for 13 major tax havens, including
Switzerland, Luxembourg, and the Cayman Islands. We thus observe the value
of the deposits held by French residents in Switzerland, by German residents in
Luxembourg, by U.S. residents in the Cayman Islands and so forth, on a quarterly
basis from the end of 2003 to the middle of 2011. Using specific country names for
the sake of concreteness, we ask: Did French holders of Swiss deposits respond to
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the 2009 French-Swiss treaty by repatriating funds to France? Did they relocate
their funds to other tax havens? Or did they simply leave them in Switzerland?
To address these questions, after providing more details on offshore tax evasion
and the data we use in Section I, we employ graphical analysis in Section II and
panel regression analysis in Section III.
We obtain two main results. First, treaties have had a statistically significant
but quite modest impact on bank deposits in tax havens: a treaty between say
France and Switzerland causes an approximately 11 percent decline in the Swiss
deposits held by French residents. Second, and more importantly, the treaties
signed by tax havens have not triggered significant repatriations of funds, but
rather a relocation of deposits between tax havens. We observe this pattern in
the aggregate data: the global value of deposits in havens remains the same two
years after the start of the crackdown, but the havens that have signed many
treaties have lost deposits at the expense of those that have signed few. We
also observe this pattern in the bilateral panel regressions: after say France and
Switzerland sign a treaty, French deposits increase in havens that have no treaty
with France.
The finding that tax evaders shift deposits in response to treaties, our key result,
illustrates an important pitfall of the current approach to the fight against tax
evasion. Tax havens are whitelisted after signing 12 treaties, leaving considerable
scope for tax evaders to ensure that their assets are not covered by a treaty. Our
analysis shows that tax evaders exploit this possibility, which ultimately provides
incentives for tax havens to keep their treaty networks at the minimum. From a
normative viewpoint, our paper thus lends support to the idea developed theoret-
ically by Elsayyad and Konrad (2011) that a “big bang” multilateral agreement
should be preferred to the current sequential approach.
The finding that treaties have had a modestly sized impact on bank deposits
has several possible interpretations between which we cannot discriminate con-
clusively with the data at our disposal. First, most tax evaders may have chosen
not to move deposits because they considered that treaties did not substantially
increase the probability they be detected. This interpretation is consistent with
the fact that treaties only rarely lead to actual exchange of information in prac-
tice. Yet another possible interpretation is that the modest size of our estimates
is due to limitations of our deposit dataset. For instance, some tax evaders use
sham corporations with addresses in Panama and the British Virgin Islands as
nominal holders of their bank accounts in Switzerland and other havens, which
obscures who ultimately owns part of the funds offshore. We tackle this issue
in Section IV, for the first time in this literature, and we show that the funds
held through sham corporations might have responded strongly to the treaties.
Lastly, tax evaders might have declared some of their assets to tax authorities
while keeping them offshore. In Section V we analyze a novel dataset with di-
rect information on income that European owners of Swiss accounts voluntarily
declare. We find no signs that treaties induced Swiss account holders to comply
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more with tax laws, but we cannot rule out an increase in compliance in other
tax havens.
Our paper adds to the literature on tax treaties, where a recurring finding is
that treaties have little real economic effects (e.g., Blonigen and Davies, 2005;
di Giovanni, 2005; Louie and Rousslang, 2008). Relative to this literature, our
contribution is to focus on the information sharing provisions included in tax
treaties rather than on those aimed at promoting cross-border investments and
limiting double taxation. The effectiveness of information sharing mechanisms is
rarely assessed and our paper contributes to filling this gap.2
We also contribute to the literature on how tax policies affect international
investments (e.g., Chan, Covrig and Ng, 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2011). A
branch of this literature initiated by Alworth and Andresen (1992) focuses on
the determinants of cross-border deposits such as taxes, interest rate differentials
and distance. Huizinga and Nicode`me (2004) find that information exchange
agreements have no significant effect on cross-border deposits in OECD countries.
We focus, by contrast, on how tax treaties affect deposits in tax havens. This
evaluation was not possible before 2009, the year when most tax havens started
signing information exchange treaties.3
Lastly, our paper sheds new light on the activities taking place in tax havens,
a topic which is attracting increasing interest (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2006;
Dharmapala, 2008; Dharmapala and Hines, 2009; Palan, Murphy and Chav-
agneux, 2010). Tax havens provide corporations and individuals with oppor-
tunities to avoid or evade taxes. The bulk of the literature focuses on the use
of tax havens by corporations, following Hines and Rice (1994). By contrast, we
focus on their use by households, which is still little studied.
I. Offshore Tax Evasion By Households: Context and Data
A. Policies to Prevent Offshore Tax Evasion
Tax havens such as Switzerland, Singapore, and the Cayman Islands host an
important wealth management industry which provides foreigners with an oppor-
tunity to evade taxes. If a French household entrusts assets to a French bank,
there is automatic reporting of capital income to the French tax authorities: eva-
sion of the personal income tax is impossible. But if it entrusts assets to a Swiss
bank, there is no automatic reporting: French authorities have to rely on self-
reporting and tax evasion is possible.4 Using official Swiss statistics and anomalies
in the international investment data of countries, Zucman (2013) estimates that
2A complementary contribution is Blonigen, Oldenski and Sly (2011) who study whether information
exchange agreements affect foreign direct investments (while we look at bank deposits and tax evasion).
3Two related papers are Hemmelgarn and Nicode`me (2009) and Johannesen (2010), who study the
effects of the Savings Directive, a European policy initiative that imposes a tax on interest income earned
by European Union residents in a number of tax havens. We discuss in the conclusion the relative merits
of withholding taxes and treaties in light of our results.
4 Kleven et al. (2011) document the importance of third-party reporting to prevent tax evasion.
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around 8 percent of households’ global financial wealth is held in tax havens. This
figure implies substantial tax revenue losses due to outright fraud.
Missing information on income earned through bank accounts in tax havens
is the key problem for enforcing personal capital income taxes. Exchange of in-
formation between countries is the obvious solution. There are two main ways
countries can exchange information: automatically or upon request (Keen and
Ligthart, 2006). Automatic exchange of information is widely acknowledged to
be the most effective solution because it allows tax authorities to obtain com-
prehensive data about income earned by domestic residents in foreign banks.
But information exchange upon request is more common. It is the standard
promoted by the OECD and embedded in the treaties signed by tax havens. Un-
der the amended French-Swiss treaty, French authorities can request information
from Switzerland to enforce tax laws. Requests must concern specific taxpayers.
France cannot ask for a list of all its residents with funds in Switzerland. More-
over, the requested information must be “foreseeably relevant” (OECD, 2008, p.
38): information can be obtained by French authorities only if they have a well
documented suspicion that a resident is evading taxes. All the treaties signed by
tax havens have identical wording: they follow the OECD model tax convention.
The usefulness of the OECD standard of information exchange is the object
of much controversy. Critics argue that since placing a request for information
requires prior knowledge, which is extremely hard to come about, little can be
obtained through treaties (Sheppard, 2009). And indeed, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (2011) revealed that during the 2006-2010 period, the U.S.
placed only 894 requests under its more than 80 tax treaties. Since a single Swiss
bank admitted in 2008 to have more than 19,000 U.S. clients with undeclared
bank accounts (U.S. Senate, 2008), information exchange upon request is clearly
associated with a small probability of detecting tax evasion. Advocates of the
OECD standard, on the other hand, stress that even a small probability of detec-
tion may be sufficient to deter tax evasion and that information exchange upon
request is a major step forward from no exchange at all.
Since the end of the 1990s, the OECD has tried to convince tax havens to
sign information exchange treaties. But, as shown by Figure 1, most havens
declined to sign treaties until the financial crisis.5 The turning point occurred in
April 2009. The OECD specified that each tax haven should conclude at least 12
treaties to be in compliance and drew up a list of 42 non-compliant havens. The
G20 threatened to impose economic sanctions on non-compliant havens. In just
five days, all havens committed to signing 12 treaties and the G20 declared the
era of bank secrecy over (G20, 2009).
As a result of G20 pressure, treaty signature effectively boomed in 2009 and
2010. But the pace slowed down considerably after 2010. Moreover, tax havens
signed many treaties with each other: in 2009, almost one-third of the treaties
5All the data on tax treaties and aggregate bank deposits used for this research are available online
on the authors’ websites.
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Figure 1. Number of Bank Information Exchange Treaties Signed by Tax Havens, by Year
Note: The figure charts the the number of new treaties or amendment to existing treaties allowing for
information exchange signed each year by the world’s 52 tax havens (see list in the Online Appendix).
Source: Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (1998-2011)
and authors’ research (see Online Appendix).
signed by tax havens were with other havens. Such haven-haven treaties do not
help non-haven countries curb tax evasion in any way. In all likelihood they only
reflect the desire of some tax havens to reach the 12 treaties threshold without
giving substantial concessions.
B. Data on Tax Treaties
To study the effects of the G20 tax haven crackdown, we have compiled a
complete dataset on the treaties concluded by tax havens. The dataset covers 52
tax havens (see the Online Appendix), more than 220 potential partner countries,
and includes information until the end of 2011q2.
Tax havens can start exchanging information with partner countries on the
basis of two types of legal events: new treaties or amendments to existing treaties
on the one hand (for instance, the amendment to the French-Swiss tax treaty in
August 2009), and changes in domestic laws allowing for information exchange
with existing treaty partners on the other (Cyprus passed such a law in July
2008). The two types of events are legally equivalent, but new treaties may be
more salient than subtle changes in the banking laws of tax havens. Distinguishing
between the two kinds of legal events allows us to investigate whether depositors
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respond differently to more salient events.6
The main data source is the Exchange of Tax Information Portal, which repre-
sents the best effort of the OECD to gather accurate information on tax treaties.7
In some cases, we have added information from official government websites. The
Online Appendix describes step-by-step how we compiled the treaty dataset from
readily available sources. The final dataset includes 1,025 events: 861 new treaties
or amendments to existing treaties, and 164 instances when changes in domestic
laws rendered information exchange possible under existing treaties. Note that
since there are 52 tax havens and around 220 countries and territories in the
world, a full network of treaties would include around 11,000 treaties. Through
a peer-review evaluation, the OECD assesses whether the treaties signed by tax
havens are properly drafted and enforced. Out of the 861 new treaties signed from
2004 to mid-2011, 68 percent were deemed compliant, 13 percent were deemed
not compliant, and 19 percent were still unreviewed in November 2011.
C. Data on Deposits in Tax Havens
Our second data source is the BIS locational banking statistics, which contain
information on foreign bank deposits in 41 countries. The BIS publishes quarterly
data aggregated at the country level, for instance total deposits held by French
residents in foreign banks and total deposits held by foreign residents in Swiss
banks. For our study and on the condition that we do not disclose bilateral
information, the BIS has given us access to deposit data at the bilateral level,
for instance deposits held by French residents in Swiss banks. There are 18 tax
havens reporting to the BIS. We have access to bilateral deposit data for 13 of
them: Austria, Belgium, the Cayman Islands, Chile, Cyprus, Guernsey, the Isle
of Man, Jersey, Luxembourg, Macao, Malaysia, Panama, and Switzerland. We
also have bilateral data for the aggregate of the remaining 5 havens: Bahamas,
Bahrain, Hong Kong, the Netherlands Antilles, and Singapore.8 The 13 havens
for which we have bilateral data host about 75 percent of the deposits of all BIS-
reporting havens, which allows us to make reasonable inference from this sample
of countries.
The BIS locational banking statistics are widely used in international economics
and are a key input to statistics on balance of payments. The most important
financial centers (havens and non-havens) report to the BIS. New financial centers
are systematically included in the BIS statistics once they reach a significant size,
so that the havens not covered are by construction very small. Further, within
6 Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) provide evidence of the importance of salience for the response to
taxes.
7See http://eoi-tax.org/. We have also benefited from discussions with Jeremy Maddison and
Sanjeev Sharma from the OECD.
8The secession of the Netherlands Antilles in October 2010 resulted in two new countries, Curaao and
Sint Maarten. Curaao took over the reporting obligation to the BIS. Note also that we do not include
Bermuda in our list of tax havens, because there are no private wealth management activities there (only
4 banks are registered in Bermuda).
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each covered center there is almost full coverage of deposits, because all the banks
with cross-border positions in excess of a modest threshold (e.g., $10 million in the
Bahamas) are required to report. The Bank for International Settlements (2006)
indicates that coverage rates systematically exceed 90 percent. The reporting
requirements of the BIS do not violate any bank secrecy provisions, because banks
do not report data on individual customers but only aggregate figures.
The BIS data, however, have three limitations. First, it is not possible to know
what fraction of the deposits in tax havens belong to households evading taxes.
The BIS provides a sectoral decomposition between deposits owned by banks and
by “non-banks.” Since interbank deposits do not play a role in personal income
tax evasion, we focus on the deposits of “non-banks.” Part of these deposits,
however, belong to multinational corporations that stash cash offshore and that
are not affected by bank information sharing. Ideally we would like to observe
the deposits that belong to households only. Since this is not possible, we cannot
directly estimate the behavioral response of tax evaders: all we can do is making
inference from the evolution of the deposits owned by “non-banks.”
To do so, we need an idea of what fraction of “non-bank” deposits belong to
households. Data made available by a number of BIS-participating central banks
enable us to shed light on this issue. In Switzerland, the second largest offshore
center in terms of “non-bank” deposits, 80-90 percent of the deposits seem to
belong to households.9 The Bank of England reports that in 2007 households
owned about 70-75 percent of the deposits in the Channel Islands and the Isle of
Man, collectively the third largest offshore center. And a previous study (Zucman,
2013), using different data, found that at least 50 percent of haven deposits likely
belong to households.10 On the basis of these elements, our baseline assumption
when we interpret the results will be that tax evaders own about 50 percent of
the deposits in tax havens.
The second limitation of the BIS data is that they are based on immediate
rather than beneficial ownership. If a French individual owns a Swiss deposit
through a sham corporation with an address in Panama, the BIS assigns the
funds to Panama. Almost 25 percent of all deposits in tax havens are registered
as belonging to other havens reflecting the widespread use of sham corporations
by clients of offshore banks. Our analysis in Section IV will explicitly address the
9There are two types of Swiss bank deposits covered by the BIS data: regular deposits (10-20 percent
of the total) and “fiduciary deposits” (80-90 percent). In all likelihood, fiduciary deposits entirely belong
to individuals: these are investments made by Swiss banks in foreign money markets on behalf of foreign
individuals, an arrangement that enables clients of Swiss banks to avoid the 35 percent tax imposed by
Switzerland on Swiss-source capital income. Multinational corporations do not use fiduciary deposits
because they can directly invest in foreign money markets without having to pay the handsome fees
charged by Swiss banks for these operations. For more details on fiduciary deposits, see e.g. Brown,
Do¨beli and Saure´ (2011).
10The figure was obtained as follows. On the basis of official Swiss National Bank statistics and of large
anomalies in the international investment data of countries, Zucman (2013) estimates that individuals
owned at least $6tr in financial assets through bank accounts in tax havens in end 2008, of which $1.4 tr
took the form of bank deposits. These $1.4 tr account for 50 percent of the total deposits in tax havens
as per the BIS.
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existence of deposits held through sham corporations.
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Figure 2. Bank Deposits in Haven and Non-Haven Countries, 2004-2011 (bn US$)
Note: All figures are yearly averages (first semester-average for 2011).
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2002-2011, Table 3B).
Lastly, the BIS data relate to only one form of wealth held by households in
tax havens: bank deposits. They do not provide information on the equity and
bond portfolios that savers entrust to tax haven banks. There is little public
information on households’ offshore portfolios, except in Switzerland. The Swiss
National Bank reports that about 25 percent of the funds held by foreigners in
Switzerland take the form of bank deposits, while 75 percent are equities and
bonds (Zucman, 2013). With the data at our disposal, we cannot say anything
about the response of tax evaders’ portfolio wealth to treaties: we can only analyze
the evolution of deposits. It is safe, however, to assume that the response of bank
deposits is a good proxy for the response of the overall stock of offshore wealth,
because the information exchange provisions of treaties affect all assets similarly.
II. Graphical Evidence
A. The Effects of the G20 Initiative on Aggregate Deposits
As a starting point for the empirical analysis, Figure 2 shows the evolution of
the bank deposits held on aggregate in the 18 tax havens reporting to the BIS.
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Despite the wave of treaties signed in 2009-2010, deposits in tax havens remained
stable over the 2007-2011 period at around $2,700 billion. For comparison, the
figure shows the evolution of the deposits held on aggregate in the non-haven
countries reporting to the BIS. This group includes financial centers that have a
large treaty network and have not been affected by the G20 initiative, such as
the U.S. or Germany. Deposits in havens and non-havens have followed a similar
trend over the 2004-2011 period. The evolution of deposits in non-havens might
be an imperfect counterfactual for the evolution of deposits in tax havens, but we
can at least exclude that the G20 crackdown was followed by a significant drop
in aggregate deposits in tax havens.
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Figure 3. Bank Deposits in Treaty and No-Treaty Country-Pairs, 2002-2011 (bn US$)
Note: The figure charts the evolution of the deposits held by savers of country i in banks of tax haven
j for the set of country-haven pairs (i, j) that signed a treaty deemed compliant by the OECD between
January 1st 2008 and June 30th 2011, and the set of country-haven pairs that did not. Saver countries
exclude tax havens. Tax havens include Austria, Belgium, Chile, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Guernsey,
the Isle of Man, Jersey, Luxembourg, Macao, Malaysia, Panama, and Switzerland. All figures are yearly
averages (first semester-average for 2011) and expressed in billion U.S. dollars.
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2002-2011), restricted bilateral locational banking statistics.
Next, we compare the deposits that have become covered by a treaty to the
deposits that have not. We consider all country-haven combinations (e.g., France-
Switzerland) among the 13 havens for which we have bilateral deposit data and
the more than 200 countries holding deposits in these havens. From this universe,
we construct two groups: a “treaty” group including all country-haven pairs that
signed a compliant treaty between 1 January 2008 and 30 June 2011, and a “no-
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treaty” group including all other pairs. Figure 3 shows that deposits decreased
moderately in the “treaty” group but remained roughly stable in the “no-treaty”
group. Should all deposits have followed the same trend, the deposits in the
“treaty” group would have been around 15 percent larger in 2011. Figure 3
suggests that at least some tax evaders responded to treaty signatures, although
it does not reveal the nature of this response.
B. The Effects of the G20 Initiative on the Deposits in Each Tax Haven
To investigate how tax evaders responded to treaties, we examine the evolution
of deposits in each tax haven between 2007 and 2011. Figure 4 reveals that the
globally stable level of deposits in tax havens conceals significant differences across
havens. Banks in Jersey lost the equivalent of 4 percent of the 2007 total amount
of haven deposits (i.e., about 8 percent of tax evaders’ deposits, if tax evaders own
about 50 percent of haven deposits), while banks in Hong Kong gained around
2.5 percent (about 5 percent of tax evaders’ deposits).
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Note: The figure charts the evolution of the foreign-owned deposits in each BIS-reporting tax haven. We
compare first semester of 2011 averages with 2007 averages (except for Cyprus which started reporting
in 2008q4 and Malaysia which started in 2007q4), and express the difference as a fraction of the deposits
held in all tax havens in 2007 ($2,600bn).
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2002-2011, Table 3B).
Crucially, the deposit gains and losses correlate strongly with the number of
treaties signed by each haven. Figure 5 plots the percentage change of each haven’s
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deposits between 2007 and 2011 against the number of compliant treaties signed
over the same period. Cyprus signed only 2 compliant treaties and experienced a
60 percent increase in its deposits, whereas Guernsey signed 19 compliant treaties
and experienced a 15 percent decrease. A simple bivariate regression suggests that
an additional treaty signed by a haven is associated with a decrease of 3.8 percent
of the deposits in its banks (with a standard error of 1.4 percent).11
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Figure 5. Deposit Growth and Treaty Signature Activity of Tax Havens, 2007-2011
Note: The figure charts the growth rate of the deposits in each BIS-reporting tax haven between 2007
(year average, except for Cyprus which started reporting in 2008q4 and Malaysia which started in 2007q4)
and 2011 (first semester average), as a function of the number of compliant treaties signed between the
beginning of 2008 and the end of the first semester 2011. b is the coefficient of the slope with standard
error in parentheses.
Source: Deposits: Bank for International Settlements (2002-2011, Table 3B). Compliant treaties: Global
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (1998-2011) and authors’ research,
see Online Appendix.
Overall, the graphical evidence suggests that a number of tax evaders responded
to treaties and that their response was mostly to transfer deposits to other tax
havens, leaving roughly unchanged the funds globally held in tax havens. Figure
6 lends additional support to this conjecture. It shows that there is no correla-
tion between the number of treaties signed by OECD countries with tax havens
between 2007 and 2011 and the growth of the deposits held by OECD countries’
residents in tax havens. Signing more treaties does not seem to help OECD
11This correlation remains when we consider cumulated exchange rate adjusted net flows in each haven
as a percentage of end-2007 stocks rather than the simple growth rate of deposits, or when we consider
all treaties signed, whether complying with the OECD standard, unreviewed, or not complying.
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countries repatriate funds.
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Number of compliant treaties signed with BIS-reporting havens between January 2008 
and June 2011 
Figure 6. Deposit Growth and Treaty Signature Activity of OECD countries, 2007-2011
Note: The figure charts the growth rate of the deposits held by each OECD country in BIS-reporting
tax havens between 2007 (year average) and 2011 (first semester average), as a function of the number
of compliant treaties signed between the beginning of 2008 and the end of the first semester 2011. b is
the coefficient of the slope with standard error in parentheses.
Source: Deposits: Bank for International Settlements (2002-2011), restricted bilateral locational banking
statistics. Compliant treaties: Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax
Purposes (1998-2011) and authors’ research, see Online Appendix.
While the graphical evidence suggests a consistent scenario, it aggregates treaties
signed at different dates and does not fully exploit the bilateral nature of our data.
To deal with this, we now turn to panel regression analysis.
III. Regression-Based Evidence
A. The Impact of Treaties on Bilateral Deposits
The first question we want to address is whether treaties have had a statisti-
cally significant impact on deposits in tax havens at the bilateral level. We run
regressions of the form:
(1) log(Depositsijq) = α+ βSignedijq + γij + θq + ijq
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where Depositsijq denotes the deposits held by residents of country i with banks
of haven j at the end of quarter q, Signedijq is a dummy equal to 1 if a treaty
allowing for information exchange between i and j exists in quarter q, γij denotes
country-pair fixed effects, and θq time fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is β:
should treaties have any effect at all, β should be statistically different from zero.
The country-pair fixed effects γij control for all time invariant characteristics of
country-haven pairs, such as distance or common language. The time fixed effects
θq control for all common time trends affecting the deposits in tax havens, such
as the financial crisis. Thus, β only captures the deposit changes in the “treaty”
country-haven pairs that come in addition to the deposit changes in the “no-
treaty” pairs. All the regressions use the sample period 2003q4-2011q2 and have
robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair level.
The first column of Table 1 estimates equation 1 using the complete universe
of country-haven pairs for which we have bilateral deposit data. We find that the
deposits of the “treaty” pairs are smaller after treaty signature than before relative
to the deposits of the “no treaty” pairs. But the coefficient is only borderline
significant.
We then in col. (2) restrict the sample to the universe of pairs that include one
haven and one non-haven country, in order for our coefficient β to exclude the
effect of the treaties signed by havens with each other on haven-haven deposits.
Treaties now have a larger effect; β is different from zero at the 5 percent level.
Col. (3) investigates the effect of haven-haven treaties on haven-haven deposits.
We find that a treaty between say the British Virgin Islands (BVI) and Jersey
does not affect the deposits “held by” the BVI in Jersey, consistent with our
notion that treaties between two havens have no economic meaning. We continue
the analysis with the sample that excludes haven-haven pairs. We refer the reader
to Section IV for a detailed analysis of how haven-haven deposits have responded
to treaties between haven and non-haven countries.
In col. (4), we investigate whether depositors respond differently to new treaties
and to changes in the domestic laws of tax havens. Since new treaties are more
salient to tax evaders, we conjecture that evaders should respond more to new
treaties. We interact the dummy variable Signed with dummy variables indicat-
ing whether the legal event establishing information exchange is a new treaty or
a change in domestic law. The results show that new treaties affect deposits but
equivalent changes in domestic laws do not.
The timing of the response to treaty signature is analyzed in col. (5). We
include a dummy equal to one in the quarter q of the legal event establishing
information exchange (Contemp), three dummies equal to one in q+1, q+2, and
q + 3 respectively, and a dummy equal to one in all quarters after q + 3. We find
that the bulk of the response occurs two quarters and more after treaty signature.
A plausible explanation is that treaties do not enter into force immediately after
they are signed. For instance, the amendment to the French-Swiss treaty signed
in August 2009 entered into force in November 2010. Typically, there is a time
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Table 1—Baseline Panel Regressions of Bilateral Bank Deposits on Treaty Signature
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BANK: havens BANK: havens BANK: havens BANK: havens BANK: havens
VARIABLES SAVER: all SAVER: non-havens SAVER: havens SAVER: non-havens SAVER: non-havens
Signed -0.0849* -0.1156** 0.0457
(0.0893) (0.0349) (0.6926)
Signed × NewTreaty -0.1349**
(0.0243)
Signed × DomLaw 0.0163
(0.8825)
Signed (Contemp) 0.0223
(0.6331)
Signed  (+1 quarter) -0.0927
(0.1300)
Signed (+2 quarters) -0.1306**
(0.0449)
Signed (+3 quarters) -0.1724***
(0.0057)
Signed (>3 quarters) -0.1818**
(0.0137)
Constant 3.4685*** 3.2187*** 4.3499*** 3.2171*** 3.2196***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 39,758 30,960 8,798 30,960 30,960
R-squared 0.0870 0.0796 0.1167 0.0798 0.0803
Number of panelid 1,631 1,285 346 1,285 1,285
Countrypair FE YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES
Note: p-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair level. ***
denotes significance at the 1 percent threshold, ** at the 5 percent threshold, and * at the 10 percent
threshold. The dependent variable is the stock of deposits held by savers of country i in banks of tax
haven j at the end of quarter q. The unit of observation is the country-haven pair (i, j) and the sample
period goes from 2003q4 to 2011q2. For a given haven j there are up to 220 saving countries i, and we
consider the deposits held in 13 tax havens j. Signed is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists a treaty
providing for information exchange between i and j in quarter q. NewTreaty is a dummy equal to 1
if the event establishing information exchange is a new treaty; DomLaw is a dummy equal to 1 if the
event establishing information exchange is a change in haven’s j domestic law. Signed (Contemp) is a
dummy equal to 1 in the quarter q when the legal event establishing information exchange between i and
j occurs; Signed (+1 quarter) is a dummy equal to 1 in q + 1, and so on.
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2002-2011), restricted bilateral locational banking statistics.
lag of 3-5 quarters between treaty signature and entry into force.
Table 1 confirms that there is a correlation between treaties and deposits in
tax havens: on average, the deposits in the “treaty” pairs decrease after treaty
signature relative to the deposits in the “no treaty” pairs. The difference is
statistically significant. But it is quite modest about 11 percent according to col.
(2).12 How should we interpret this result?
Because the BIS data include deposits owned by corporations that are not con-
cerned by information sharing agreements, our estimated β only provides a lower
bound for the response of tax evaders. If tax evaders own a fraction s of deposits,
one can show that their response to treaties is approximately β/s.13 To interpret
12exp(−0.1156) − 1 = 0.109
13In a simple difference-in-differences setting in which deposits in the treaty group grow at rate gt and
deposits in the no-treaty group grow at rate gc, the estimator of the response of bank deposits to treaty
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what a 11 percent drop in deposits means, we need to take a stance on how large
s is. If, as available evidence suggests, s is around 50 percent, then treaties are
associated with a roughly 22 percent average drop in tax evaders’ deposits. This
is probably much more than expected by those who considered treaties worthless:
upon request information exchange seems enough to substantially affect behavior.
But it does not seem strong enough to affect the deposit behavior of the majority
of individuals: as long as s is larger than 20-25 percent, our results imply that
only a minority of tax evaders (weighted by assets) have moved funds in response
to treaties.
Another issue in the interpretation of the magnitude of β is that if tax evaders
respond to treaties by shifting deposits, then our comparison group of “no treaty”
country-pairs is also affected by treaty signature. We now augment the model to
tackle this issue.
B. Deposit Shifting
Table 2 explicitly models shifting behavior. To fix ideas, consider the France-
Cayman Islands pair. To explain the amount of French deposits held in the
Cayman Islands, we introduce in col. (1)-(3) a treaty coverage variable that simply
counts the number of treaties signed by France with the world’s 51 tax havens
other than the Cayman Islands. Col. (1) shows that an additional treaty signed
by France, say with Switzerland, increases the deposits held by French residents in
the Cayman Islands by 0.6 percent. More generally, it increases French deposits
by an average of 0.6 percent in each of the 12 havens other than Switzerland
for which we have bilateral data. It is natural to assume that deposits are also
shifted to the havens for which we have no bilateral data, which host around 25
percent of offshore deposits. If each haven attracts funds in proportion to its
initial deposit stock, a treaty signed by France with Switzerland increases French
deposits in each of the world’s havens other than Switzerland by 0.6 percent.14
As col. (2) shows, this shifting only occurs to the benefit of the havens that
do not have a treaty with France (i.e., when Signed = 0). In such havens, an
additional treaty signed by France is associated with 1.2 percent more French-
owned deposits. By contrast, the havens that have a treaty with France (i.e., when
Signed = 1) do not attract deposits. Note also that when we account for shifting,
the signature of a treaty between say France and Switzerland still significantly
decreases French deposits in Switzerland, just as we found previously.15
signature (in a log specification) is log[(1 + gt)/(1 + gc)]. If a fraction s of deposits initially belong to
tax evaders, then the diff-in-diff estimator for the response of tax evaders is: log[(s+ gt)/(s+ gc)]. At a
first order approximation this is 1/s times larger than log[(1 + gt)/(1 + gc)].
14The fact we do not have bilateral data for all the world’s tax havens does not bias our estimate of
the magnitude of shifting. Having more bilateral data would simply make our estimate more precise.
15In col. (2) of Table 2, Signed appears in three places, all of which need to be accounted for when
computing the total effect of an additional treaty on bilateral deposit. Assuming that treaty coverage=6
(which is the mean number of compliant treaties signed by OECD countries with tax havens in the 2008-
2011 period), the total coefficient on Signed is −0.0498 + 6× (0.0001− 0.0120) = −0.12. This coefficient
is comparable to the coefficient found in col. (2) of Table 1.
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Table 2—Panel Regressions of Bilateral Bank Deposits Taking Into Account Deposit Shifting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BANK: havens BANK: havens BANK: havens BANK: havens BANK: havens BANK: havens
SAVER: non-havens SAVER: non-havens SAVER: non-havens SAVER: non-havens SAVER: non-havens SAVER: non-havens
VARIABLES
TREATY COVERAGE: 
number
TREATY COVERAGE: 
number
TREATY COVERAGE: 
number
TREATY COVERAGE: 
share
TREATY COVERAGE: 
share
TREATY COVERAGE: 
share
Signed -0.1659*** -0.0498 -0.0750 -0.1468** -0.0816 -0.0933
(0.0052) (0.4286) (0.2410) (0.0139) (0.2444) (0.1852)
Saving tax directive (STD) -0.2161*** -0.2198*** -0.1553*** -0.2130*** -0.2135*** -0.1815***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0077) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0018)
Treaty coverage 0.0059** 0.1272*
(0.0402) (0.0568)
Treaty coverage × Signed 0.0001 0.0277
(0.9719) (0.7373)
Treaty coverage × (1- Signed) 0.0120*** 0.1752**
(0.0033) (0.0318)
Treaty coverage × STD × Signed -0.0030 -0.0679
(0.3202) (0.4762)
Treaty coverage × (1-STD) × Signed 0.0066 -0.0927
(0.1937) (0.4975)
Treaty coverage × STD × (1-Signed) -0.0071 0.1913*
(0.3697) (0.0962)
Treaty coverage × (1-STD) × (1-Signed) 0.0183*** 0.2868***
(0.0000) (0.0027)
Constant 3.2147*** 3.2115*** 3.2094*** 3.2285*** 3.2275*** 3.2259***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 30,960 30,960 30,960 30,610 30,610 30,610
R-squared 0.0829 0.0841 0.0867 0.0835 0.0838 0.0855
Number of panelid 1,285 1,285 1,285 1,264 1,264 1,264
Countrypair fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: p-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair level. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent threshold,
** at the 5 percent threshold, and * at the 10 percent threshold. The dependent variable is the stock of deposits held by savers of country i in banks of
tax haven j at the end of quarter q. The unit of observation is the country-haven pair (i, j) and the sample period goes from 2003q4 to 2011q2. Signed
is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists a treaty providing for information exchange between i and j in quarter q. STD is a dummy equal to one if the
country-haven pair (i, j) applies the EU Savings Directive. In col. (1)-(3), Treaty coverage counts the number of treaties that i has with tax havens other
than j. In col. (4)-(6), Treaty coverage measures the share of the deposits held in 2004 by residents of country i in BIS-reporting havens that are covered
by a treaty in quarter q.
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2002-2011), restricted bilateral locational banking statistics.
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Since 2005, 18 tax havens have cooperated with EU countries in combatting
tax evasion under the Savings Directive. When a bank in Jersey, for instance,
pays interest to a French resident, it withholds 35 percent of the interest payment
as a tax and remits 75 percent of the proceeds to France without disclosing the
identity of the taxpayer. A number of havens, however, do not participate in
the Directive, most notably Singapore, Hong Kong, the Bahamas, and Bahrain.
Strikingly, we find that deposit shifting in response to treaties only occurs to
the benefit of the havens that do not participate in the EU Savings Directive.
As shown in col. (3), an additional treaty signed by France does not affect the
deposits in havens that apply the Directive (i.e., when STD=1), but it increases
deposits by 1.8 percent in havens that do not apply it and do not have a treaty
with France. To put it simply, deposits go to the least compliant havens. Table 2
also confirms the finding of existing studies that the Directive itself significantly
affected the bank deposits of EU residents in participating havens (Johannesen,
2010).
The number of treaties signed is a crude measure of treaty coverage. Treaties
with Switzerland and Luxembourg are much more important for France in fighting
tax evasion than treaties with Vanuatu and Saint Lucia. We therefore construct
a second measure of treaty coverage that weighs treaties according to their im-
portance.
For each country i and haven j for which we have bilateral deposit data, we
compute the share of i’s deposits in tax havens which were placed in j during
the first year of our sample. In 2004, the location of deposits was unaffected
by the European Savings Directive which was not yet implemented, and largely
unaffected by treaties which were still few in numbers. The shares, therefore,
measure the relative importance of haven j to tax evaders of country i and are
exogenous to recent policy developments. For each country-haven pair (i, j), we
use the shares to weigh each treaty concluded by i with havens other than j. The
resulting measure of treaty coverage takes values between zero (no treaty) and
one (full coverage). By construction, this measure only takes into account treaty
coverage over the 13 havens for which we have bilateral deposit data.
As col. (4) to (6) show, with this measure of treaty coverage the results are
similar to those obtained with the measure that merely counts the number of
treaties signed. Consider a treaty between France and a haven which, in 2004,
attracted 10 percent of the deposits owned by French residents in tax havens.
According to col. (4), such a treaty causes a 1.2 percent average increase in French
deposits in each other BIS-reporting tax haven. As col. (5) and (6) suggest, only
the havens that have no treaty with France and that are not covered by the EU
Savings Directive attract deposits.
The results in Tables 1 and 2 show that there is a strong correlation between
treaty signature and subsequent deposit growth in tax havens. To conclude that
the changes in deposits we observe are caused by treaties, we need to assume
that in a counterfactual world without treaties, the deposits in the “treaty” and
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“no treaty” pairs would have grown similarly. This key identifying assumption
deserves a careful examination.
C. Tests of Identification Strategy
We have conducted two tests of our identification strategy. A first test ex-
amines the possibility that tax havens might have systematically signed treaties
with countries that were placing less and less deposits in their banks relative to
the global trend, which would introduce a spurious relationship between treaty
signature and deposit growth. We investigate this possibility by running probit
models of the form:
(2) Treatyijq = α+ β2Growthijq + δXijq + γDistanceij + ζi + θq + ijq
where Treatyijq is a dummy equal to 1 if i and j sign an information exchange
treaty in quarter q, Growthijq captures the growth rate of the deposits held by
savers of country i in haven j before quarter q, Xijq includes other bilateral
factors, ζi denotes saver-country fixed effects and θq time fixed effects.
We want to know whether the probability to sign a treaty is affected by past
deposit growth rates, i.e. whether β2 is different from zero.16 We consider two
measures of deposit growth: the percentage growth over the 4 quarters before q,
and the percentage growth from 8 quarters to 4 quarters before q. The results
are in Table 3. As col. (1) shows, the probability to sign a treaty is not affected
by the growth rate of deposits during the year preceding treaty signature. It is
marginally affected by deposit growth from 8 quarters to 4 quarters before treaty
signature, but this barely significant correlation disappears when we control for
time fixed effects (col. 2): it reflects the fact that most treaties were signed during
the financial crisis, when deposits were falling worldwide.
Col. (3) and (4) show that the level of deposits, distance, and GDP are signif-
icant determinants of the probability to sign a treaty. But when we control for
those factors, the probability to sign a treaty remains unaffected by past growth
rates of deposits. On average, treaties were not concluded by country-haven pairs
where deposits were growing more slowly than the global trend.
Our second test examines whether the country-haven pairs that signed a treaty
and those that did not experienced an otherwise similar evolution over the period
of study. The goal of this test is to make sure that the correlation we observe
between treaty signature and subsequent deposit growth is not driven by an un-
observed third factor such as a slowdown in the financial activity of relatively
compliant havens.
16The determinants of treaty signature have been studied theoretically by Bacchetta and Espinosa
(2000), Eggert and Kolmar (2002), and Huizinga and Nielsen (2003), and empirically by Ligthart,
Vlachaki and Voget (2011), Bilicka and Fuest (forthcoming), and Elsayyad (2012).
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Table 3—Probit Models of Treaty Signature
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BANK: havens BANK: havens BANK: havens BANK: havens
VARIABLES SAVER: non-havens SAVER: non-havens SAVER: non-havens SAVER: non-havens
Deposit growth rate, -4q to 0q 0.0004 0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0013
(0.6916) (0.4146) (0.6283) (0.7340)
Deposit growth rate, -8q to -4q -0.0017* -0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0037
(0.0849) (0.3985) (0.2841) (0.2745)
Deposits (in logs) 0.0010** 0.0034***
(0.0398) (0.0002)
Distance (in logs) -0.0041*** -0.0039*
(0.0000) (0.0513)
GDP (in logs) 0.0041*** 0.0991***
(0.0000) (0.0041)
Observations 56,069 37,053 11,844 4,743
Time fixed effect NO YES YES YES
Saver-country fixed effect NO NO NO YES
Note: p-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent
threshold, ** at the 5 percent threshold, and * at the 10 percent threshold. This table investigates
what determines the signature of a treaty between a country i and a tax haven j. The dependent
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a country i and haven j sign an information exchange treaty in
quarter q. The unit of observation is the country-haven pair (i, j) and the sample period goes from
2003q4 to 2011q2. The estimates are marginal effects. Deposit growth rate captures the growth rate
of the deposits held by savers of country i in haven j before quarter q. We consider two measures of
the growth rate of deposits: the percentage growth over the 4 quarters before q and the percentage
growth from 8 quarters to 4 quarters before q. Deposits is the log of the stocks of deposits held by
country i in haven j in quarter q, GDP the log of country’s i GDP (from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicator), Distance the geodesic distance between i and j (from the CEPII database,
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm)
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2002-2011), restricted bilateral locational banking statistics.
The idea of the test is simple: if a confounding trend were driving our results,
then treaty signature should be associated with a subsequent lower growth of
the haven activities that are unrelated to treaties. So we study how those unre-
lated activities evolve in the “treaty” and “no treaty” groups. We focus on the
inter-bank activities of tax havens. Haven-based banks receive large amounts of
deposits from foreign banks, which they use in turn to grant loans. Interbank de-
posits received by tax havens are unrelated to personal tax evasion, so they should
not be affected by information exchange agreements. But they are sensitive to
the international business cycle, to domestic conditions in the havens, and more
generally to any trend that could potentially confound our analysis of treaties. In
col. (1)-(2) of Table 4, we run the same regression for interbank deposits as we
did for the deposits owned by “non-banks” in col. (2) of Table 1 and col. (2) of
Table 2, our core specifications. The results show that treaties have zero effect on
interbank deposits. In other words, interbank deposits have evolved similarly in
the “treaty” and “no-treaty” pairs. The statistically significant effect of treaties
on “non-bank” deposits is thus unlikely to be driven by an omitted differential
time trend.
Our two tests establish that we have a reasonably valid natural experiment: the
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country-haven pairs in our sample have similar ex ante and ex post observable
characteristics, the sole relevant difference being that some pairs signed an infor-
mation exchange agreements while others did not. The correlations we document
between treaty signature and subsequent deposit growth can thus be considered
causal. We present below further robustness checks.
D. Robustness Tests
OECD countries have concluded many more treaties than developing countries.
Our results, one could fear, might be driven by asymmetric shocks reducing the
deposits of developed countries relative to those of developing countries, such as
the 2008-2009 financial crisis. To address this concern, we restrict the sample to
OECD countries only. Col. (3)-(4) of Table 4 show that the response to treaties is
slightly larger in the OECD sample than in the full sample, though qualitatively
similar.
Second, we run the regressions with exchange rate adjusted deposit stocks. So
far, we have used data that convert deposits in pounds, euros or Swiss francs into
U.S. dollars using end of quarter exchange rates. If a large share of bank deposits
in Switzerland are denominated in Swiss francs and if Switzerland signed most
of its treaties during a period when the Swiss franc depreciated, there is a risk
that we capture a spurious effect of treaties on deposits. To address this issue, we
construct an exchange rate adjusted measure of deposit stocks. For each country-
pair, we know what fraction of deposits are denominated in U.S. dollars, euros,
British pounds, Swiss francs, and yen. We use this currency decomposition to
hold exchange rates fixed at their end-of-2003 level. The results are reported in
col. (5)-(6) of Table 4. The estimated effects of treaties are slightly smaller but
qualitatively identical to the core specifications.
This result may come as a surprise given the large exchange rate movements
during the financial crisis. But it can easily be explained. The Online Appendix
shows that the currency composition of deposits is strikingly similar in the group
of “treaty” and “no treaty” country-pairs: it is not correlated with treaty signa-
ture. For this reason, exchange rate changes are absorbed by our time fixed-effects
and do not interfere with the identification of the impact of treaties.
In a final robustness check, we sequentially add country-year dummies and
haven-year dummies to the core specifications. Country-year dummies control
for all time-varying factors at the country level, such as changes in compliance
efforts, capital tax rates or the incomes of top earners who are most likely to hold
assets in tax havens. Haven-year dummies control for all time-varying factors
at the haven level, such as bank crises or changes in political environment. The
results are reported in col. (7)-(10) of Table 4. The estimated effects are robust
to the inclusion of country-year dummies. When we include both country-year
dummies and haven-year dummies, we still find a modest effect of treaties on
deposits but are unable to identify a deposit shifting effect.
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Table 4—Tests of Identification Strategy and of Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) [9] [10]
VARIABLES
Signed -0.0248 -0.0425 -0.1905*** -0.1230 -0.0890* -0.0431 -0.2962*** -0.1407* -0.1163* -0.0984
(0.7963) (0.7083) (0.0094) (0.1321) (0.0954) (0.4898) (0.0001) (0.0862) (0.0744) (0.2175)
STD -0.0224 -0.5302*** -0.2279*** -0.6431*** -0.3727**
(0.8235) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0211)
Treaty coverage × Signed 0.0004 0.0052 0.0015 0.0022 0.0030
(0.9449) (0.1956) (0.5938) (0.6543) (0.5400)
Treaty coverage × (1- Signed) -0.0034 0.0128** 0.0125*** 0.0115** 0.0040
(0.6904) (0.0210) (0.0023) (0.0151) (0.3838)
Constant 3.7524*** 3.7532*** 4.8144*** 4.7834*** 3.2197*** 3.2197*** 3.2197*** 3.2197*** 3.2197*** 3.2197***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 20,489 20,489 8,049 8,049 30,693 30,693 8,049 8,049 8,049 8,049
R-squared 0.0394 0.0395 0.0852 0.1129 0.0644 0.0693 0.1744 0.1903 0.2910 0.2941
Number of panelid 1,004 1,004 307 307 1,270 1,270 307 307 307 307
Countrypair fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Saver-year dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Bank-year dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
SAVER: OECD SAVER: non-havens SAVER: OECDSAVER: non-havens
OECD countries only Exchange-rate adjusted Country-year fixed effectsInterbank deposits
BANK: havens BANK: havens BANK: havensBANK: havens
Note: p-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair level. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent threshold,
** at the 5 percent threshold, and * at the 10 percent threshold. The dependent variable is the stock of deposits held by savers of country i in banks of
tax haven j at the end of quarter q. The unit of observation is the country-haven pair (i, j) and the sample period goes from 2003q4 to 2011q2. Signed
is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists a treaty providing for information exchange between i and j in quarter q. STD is a dummy equal to one if the
country-haven pair (i, j) applies the EU Savings Directive. Treaty coverage counts the number of treaties that i has with tax havens other than j. Col.
(3)-(10) consider the deposits held by non-bank agents; col. (1)-(2) the deposits held by banks.
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2002-2011), restricted bilateral locational banking statistics.
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IV. Deposits Held Through Sham Corporations
There is a great deal of anecdotal evidence suggesting that clients of offshore
banks routinely use sham corporations with addresses in tax havens such as
Panama as nominal owners of their bank accounts in Switzerland and other
havens. The IRS, for instance, provides case studies of tax evasion by U.S. indi-
viduals through a big Swiss bank revealing a quasi-systematic use of shell com-
panies.17 This section focuses on how deposits held through sham corporations
have responded to the wave of tax treaties.
Remember that when a French saver holds assets in Switzerland through a sham
Panamanian company, the BIS assigns the funds to Panama. This convention
explains why haven-haven deposits are so important in the BIS statistics: in the
first half of 2011, they accounted for around $550 billion, almost 25 percent of all
the deposits in tax havens. Deposits from the British Virgin Islands and Panama
were particularly important. Both jurisdictions have flexible corporate laws that
make it simple to create companies in a few minutes.
Using a sham corporation as nominal account holder adds a layer of secrecy
between an account and its beneficial owner: essentially, accounts held through
sham corporations are equivalent to numbered accounts, which are today prohib-
ited by anti-money laundering regulations. Sham corporations also help avoiding
taxes: the EU Savings Directive does not apply to the deposits held by European
residents through sham companies. But they do not protect from information
exchange treaties. If France and Switzerland have a treaty and French authori-
ties suspect a taxpayer of hiding funds in Switzerland, they can ask Switzerland
to provide the relevant information, even if the funds are held through a shell
company. Banks are required by anti-money laundering regulations to know at
all times who are the ultimate owner of the assets they manage. They must pro-
vide this information to foreign authorities that file information requests under a
treaty.
The implication is that if tax evaders respond to treaty signature, then treaties
concluded between havens like Switzerland and countries like France should affect
the Swiss deposits held by French residents through sham corporations, i.e. the
Swiss deposits that the BIS assigns to the British Virgin Islands, Panama, and
other havens.
Table 5 investigates whether this is the case by analyzing the evolution of haven-
haven deposits. In col. (1), we regress haven-haven deposits (e.g., Swiss deposits
assigned to Panama) on the number of treaties concluded by banking havens (e.g.,
Switzerland) with non-haven countries (e.g., France). A treaty between France
and Switzerland reduces the Swiss deposits registered as belonging to each tax
haven by 0.7 percent on average.
17See http://www.irs.gov/uac/Offshore-Tax-Avoidance-and-IRS-Compliance-Efforts. See also
Zaki (2010) for anecdotal evidence on the use of sham corporations by Europeans, and Hanlon, Maydew
and Thornock (2011) for evidence on the use of sham offshore corporations by U.S. tax evaders for their
U.S. investments.
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Table 5—Panel Regressions of Bank Deposits Held Through Sham Corporations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BANK: havens BANK: havens BANK: havens BANK: havens
SAVER: havens SAVER: havens SAVER: havens SAVER: havens
VARIABLES
TREATY COVERAGE: 
number
TREATY COVERAGE: 
number
TREATY COVERAGE: 
share
TREATY COVERAGE: 
share
-0.0067** -0.0095*** -0.5900*** -0.6045***
(0.0188) (0.0015) (0.0000) (0.0000)
0.0087 0.0224
(0.3362) (0.9103)
0.0536 0.1005
(0.6726) (0.4022)
4.3572*** 4.3604*** 4.4043*** 4.4057***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 8,798 8,798 8,798 8,798
R-squared 0.1188 0.1199 0.1359 0.1365
Number of panelid 346 346 346 346
Countrypair fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Treaty coverage, banking haven with 
non-haven countries
Treaty coverage, banking haven with 
other tax havens
Signed
Constant
Note: p-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair level. ***
denotes significance at the 1 percent threshold, ** at the 5 percent threshold, and * at the 10 percent
threshold. The table investigates how the signature of a treaty between a tax haven (e.g., Switzerland)
and a non-haven country (e.g., France) affects the deposits recorded by the BIS as belonging to tax
havens (e.g., the deposits in Swiss banks recorded as belonging to Panama). The dependent variable
is the stock of deposits recorded as belonging to haven i (e.g., Panama) in the banks of haven j (e.g.,
Switzerland) at the end of quarter q. The unit of observation is the haven-haven pair (i, j) and the sample
period goes from 2003q4 to 2011q2. For a given banking haven j, there are up to 41 “saving” havens
i. We consider the deposits held in 13 banking havens j. In col. (1)-(2), Treaty coverage, banking
haven with non-havens counts the number of treaties that j has with non-haven countries (and Treaty
coverage,banking haven with other tax havens the number of treaties that j has with other havens). In
col. (3)-(4), the Treaty coverage, variables measure the share of the deposits held by non-haven (reps.
haven) countries in haven j in 2004 that are covered by a treaty in quarter q. Signed is a dummy equal
to 1 if there exists a treaty providing for information exchange between haven i and haven j in quarter
q.
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2002-2011), restricted bilateral locational banking statistics.
In col. (2), we investigate whether haven-haven treaties matter for the pat-
tern of haven-haven deposits. Neither a treaty between Switzerland and Panama
(Signed = 1) nor treaties between Switzerland and havens other than Panama
affect the value of the Swiss deposits assigned to Panama in the BIS statistics,
which is fully consistent with our interpretation of what haven-haven deposits
represent. Indeed, there is no reason why information exchange between Panama
and Switzerland should affect the French residents who use sham corporations in
Panama as nominal owners of their Swiss accounts.
In col. (3) and (4), we run the same regressions as in col. (1) and (2) but
with the measure of treaty coverage that weighs treaties by the importance of
the deposits covered. The estimated effects are statistically and economically
significant. Consider a treaty between France and Switzerland. Assume that
French residents hold 10 percent of all Swiss deposits belonging to non-haven
countries. Col. (3) suggests that such a treaty reduces the bank deposits in
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Switzerland registered as belonging to tax havens (e.g., Panama) by 4.5 percent.18
Now assume that French residents are also the ultimate owners of 10 percent of
the Swiss deposits registered as belonging to tax havens. Under this assumption,
a treaty between France and Switzerland causes a 45 percent reduction of the
deposits held in Switzerland by French savers through sham corporations. Under
plausible assumptions, the tax evaders who use sham corporations may have
responded strongly to the G20 crackdown.
There is one caveat, however: since we cannot identify the ultimate owners
of the deposits held through sham corporations, the results in Table 5 rely on
variation at the haven level rather than variation at the country-haven-pair level.
It is an unfortunate feature of cross-border bank deposits statistics that they
are based on immediate rather than beneficial ownership. If deposit data were
established on a beneficial ownership basis, almost no deposits would be assigned
to the British Virgin Islands or Panama; more deposits would be assigned to the
U.S., Italy, or France; and it would be easier to track the progress made in the
fight against tax evasion.
V. The Compliance Effect of Treaties
Our results so far indicate that the G20 initiative has caused a relocation of
deposits between tax havens leaving the funds globally held offshore roughly un-
changed. But depositors may have responded to the crackdown by complying
more with tax laws while keeping their funds in tax havens. In this section we
analyze the available evidence on the compliance effect of treaties.
There are two types of data at hand. First, we have direct information on
tax compliance in Switzerland, probably the most important tax haven as far as
personal wealth management is concerned.19 Since mid-2005, in the context of
the EU Savings Directive, Swiss banks must withhold a tax on interest income
paid to European households who own Swiss accounts. Savers can escape the
withholding tax if they voluntarily declare their income to their home country
tax authority. Swiss authorities have published on a yearly basis the amount of
interest earned by residents of each EU country, as well as what fraction of this
income savers have chosen to voluntarily disclose. We know for instance that in
2011, French residents earned CHF 324 million in interest, and chose to declare
33 million, or about 10 percent. To our knowledge, this unique dataset has never
been used before in the literature.20
It enables us, for one key haven and 27 counterpart countries, to conduct a
direct test of the compliance effect of treaties. We analyze how the share of
interest declared has evolved over 2006-2011 for the 15 EU countries that have
18(exp(−0.59) − 1) × 10 = 4.5 percent.
19Switzerland comes second to the Cayman Islands in terms of deposits, but an exceptionally high
fraction of deposits in Swiss banks seem to belong to individuals (80-90 percent, whereas our informed
guess for the average across all havens is about 50 percent).
20The data are available on the authors’ websites.
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signed a treaty with Switzerland since 2008 (e.g., France, Spain, Austria), and
for the 12 countries that have not (e.g., Belgium, Portugal, Hungary). As shown
by Figure 7, there has been a general increase in compliance over the 2006-2011
period. But there is no indication that this trend has been any stronger for the
countries that have signed a treaty with Switzerland. And indeed, when we use
the same regression framework as in Section III, we find that treaty signature has
no statistically significant effect on the fraction of interest that taxpayers chose
to declare.21 Despite the G20 initiative, the general level of compliance of EU
Swiss bank account holders remains low, around 10-20 percent.22
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Figure 7. Fraction of Interest Income Earned by EU Residents in Swiss Banks Declared to
Home Country Tax Authorities
Source: Administration fe´de´rale des contributions.
The second type of evidence on tax enforcement comes from the OECD (2011),
which has gathered data on the amount of taxes recovered due to increased com-
pliance on the part of offshore account holders. Over the 2009-2011 period, the
OECD (2011) reports an increase of almost EUR 14 billion in taxes paid in rich
countries. This is certainly far from negligible. However, assuming that evaders
21See Online Appendix.
22The compliance figures reported on Figure 7 are upper bounds, for one simple reason. They are
obtained by dividing interest declared by interest earned, but the denominator excludes interest earned
by EU residents through sham corporations, and a very large fraction of Swiss bank fiduciary deposits
are held through sham corporations.
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paid in taxes and penalties an amount equivalent to 5 percent of their assets
(which is what the OECD reports for Italy, Mexico, and the UK), then the OECD
figures imply that about $350bn in offshore assets may have been disclosed to tax
authorities. This figure falls short of the $6,000bn or so likely held by households
in tax havens.23 Taken at face value, the OECD’s findings do not lend support
to the view that compliance has considerably improved.
The evidence we have just described is far from systematic. There is no cross-
country database on tax compliance comparable to the BIS’ bank deposit statis-
tics. So we cannot fully exclude a large increase in compliance in havens other
than Switzerland. Better measuring compliance and its determinants is an im-
portant challenge for future research.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Conventional wisdom among policymakers is that the G20 tax haven crackdown
is a success. The evidence presented in this paper challenges this view. It suggests
that, so far, treaties have led to a relocation of bank deposits between tax havens
but have not triggered significant repatriations of funds. The least compliant
havens have attracted new clients, while the most compliant ones have lost some,
leaving roughly unchanged the total amount of wealth managed offshore.
Although this is disappointing, we emphasize that the G20 initiative is not
useless. We find evidence that some tax evaders have responded to the wave of
tax treaties. Many experts were skeptical that upon request information sharing
could achieve anything at all. Our results belie the most pessimistic views on
the efficacy of treaties: even a weak threat of enforcement is sometimes enough
to affect behavior. Further, uncertainties remain on the extent to which treaties
have induced tax evaders to comply more with tax laws while keeping their funds
offshore.
Yet our results suggest that there is room to improve the fight against offshore
tax evasion. First, the G20 could urge tax havens to sign treaties with all coun-
tries: a comprehensive multilateral agreement would prevent tax evaders from
transferring their funds from haven to haven. Second, our results suggest that
even in the presence of a complete network of upon request information exchange
treaties, there may remain a scope for improved tax collection by making treaties
more demanding.
The G20 tax haven crackdown is a major coordinated initiative against tax
evasion at the global level. Another important initiative, at the regional level, is
the European Union Savings Directive. The G20 initiative relies on information
exchange treaties; the EU Savings Directive imposes a withholding tax on interest
income earned by European residents in a number of cooperating tax havens. So
23Based on interviews with wealth managers, the Boston Consulting Group (2010) puts the amount
of offshore wealth at $7,400bn in 2009. This figure is close to the one found by Zucman (2013), who
reckons that 8 percent of households’ financial wealth is held in tax havens, which is around $6,000bn in
2008.
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far, both policies have pitfalls: treaties are not comprehensive enough; the EU
withholding tax exempts equities and derivatives, and does not look through sham
corporations that tax evaders routinely use (Johannesen, 2010; Zucman, 2013).
Therefore, what is the best tool treaty or tax to combat offshore tax evasion
remains an open question.
A comprehensive network of treaties providing for automatic exchange of infor-
mation would put an end to bank secrecy and could make tax evasion impossible.
Taxes withheld on all incomes earned by foreign residents in all tax havens could
also make tax evasion impossible, while maintaing some form of bank secrecy.
Which of the two instruments would maximize tax revenues while minimizing
administrative costs, including the costs of negotiating with tax havens? There is
need for more research on this question. Policymakers have diverging views: on
the one hand, the European Union Commission pushes for automatic exchange
of information, just like the U.S. with the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA), but on the other hand countries such as Germany and the U.K. are
negotiating a comprehensive withholding tax with Switzerland.
Another question raised by our study is why some havens cooperate more than
others. Tax havens have a strong economic interest in bank secrecy. But maybe
abandoning bank secrecy has a positive effect on a haven’s reputation, which may
help it attract other financial activity, such as the incorporation of investment
funds. This issue would deserve to be further analyzed.
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